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1. M. Finnis *
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION
Some Preliminary Considerations
"We are only feeling our way. We, ourselves, do not
properly understand our Constitution yet. We, who are
supposed to be experts, are merely children seeking the
light. But what about the people outside? They know
nothing in the world about it."
Sir John Downer (1903).1
Some Arguments and Problems
Even those who regret it accept that the founders of the Australian Constitu-
tion "beyond question ' 2 intended the separation of powers now required by
the Boilermakers' Case3 . This article seeks first to show that the arguments
advanced to prove the alleged intention are no more probative -than the drafts-
man's literary arrangement which has prompted the accepted view of con-
stitutional history; and second, to discuss the proper strategy of approach to
the historical record on these matters.
The first argument for the accepted view appeals to the form and arrange-
ment of sections 1, 61 and 71 of the Constitution4 . Notoriously, this argument
proves too much, since the symmetrical triadic classification of all governmental
power, apparently signified by this arrangement, would as much imply a
separation of legislative from executive powers as of judicial from legislative
and executive; and hardly anyone (except Sir Owen Dixon 5 ) has ever
* LL.B. (Adelaide), D.Phil. (Oxon.), Fellow of University College, Oxford.
1. 15 Parl. Deb. (Cth.), 3055. Cf. Downer's interesting remark, Deb. Fed Cony.
(Melb.) 1898, 275: "With them [the judges] rest the vast powers of judicial decision,
in saying what are the relative functions of the Commonwealth and the States.
With them rest the interpretation of intentions which we may have in our minds
but have not occurred to us at the present time . . . " Downer, of course, was a
member of the Drafting Committee of the 1897-8 Convention.
2. Sawer: "The Separation of Powers in Australian Federalism" (1961) 35 Australian
Law Journal, 177 at 178. The arguments discussed in section I infra are all taken
from this source.
3. R. v. Kirby, ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254;
A-G for Commonwealth v. R. (1957) 95 C.L.R. 529.
4. Sawer: loc. cit. supra n. 2. Boilermakers' Case (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, at 275.
5. Such seems to be the sense of Dixon: "The Law and the Constitution" (1935) 51
Law Quarterly Review 590 at 605-606.
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believed that the founders contemplated so radical a departure from the
British constitutional model.
Still, the argument has a real fascination; there is no doubt that for lawyers,
the phrasing suggests an exhaustive triadic classification which "cannot ...be
treated as ... of no legal consequence" 6 . There is no short way to exorcise
this fascination; to do this, it is necessary, first, to point out a fundamental but
rarely noticed ambiguity in the notion of "separation of powers", and second,
to show -how the legal mind naturally trades on this ambiguity in misconstruing
the definite (though ambiguously expressed) intentions of political founders
and framers. To these tasks we shall shortly turn.
The second argument appeals to a parallelism with the Constitution of the
United States, by which the Australian founders are said to have been fascin-
ated 7. The parallelism and the fascination have been exaggerated. But those
who appeal to Caesar must go to Caesar, and the fact is that the sourcebooks
of American constitutional law used by the founders drew distinctions between
notions of separation of powers that the present Australian doctrine refuses
to draw. The man primarily responsible, it seems, for the present symmetrical
form of section 71, Sir Josiah Symon, was wont to quote from the 1891 edition
of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United Statess . There he
could read that under the United States Constitution there were not a few
officers of government, such as justices of the peace, commissioners of excise,
commissioners of bankruptcy and the like, whose duties "are partly judicial,
and partly executive or ministerial ' 9. Sergeant's comment was quoted in Story
with apparent approval, to the effect that "the Constitution, in speaking of
courts and judges, means those who exercise all the regular and permanent
duties which belong to a court in the ordinary popular signification of the
terms"1 0.
The third argument for the accepted view appeals to the apparent testimony
of certain founders, contained in more or less contemporaneous commentaries
on the new constitution". This argument bears all the marks of a lawyer's,
as opposed to a historian's, approach; it ignores the primary sources, preferring
always the legal "authority", and setting aside the context and purpose of .those
6. (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254 at 275.
7. Sawer: loc. cit. supra n. 2. (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254 at 275.
8. Symon was chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the 1897 Convention. On the
work of this Committee see text infra at note 52, and Symon's account in 15 Parl.
Deb. (Cth.), 2938. Symon referred to Story as "one of the greatest and most
unquestionable authorities of all time", Deb. Fed. Cony. (Syd.) 1897, 294. The
edition of Story owned by Symon, now owned by the Public Library of South
Australia, was the fifth (1891).
9. Story: Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (5th ed. 1891), II,
444 n. 1. (Symon was not averse to reading footnotes! See Deb. Fed. Cony. (Syd.)
1898, 293).
10. Story: loc. cit., citing Sergeant on the Constitution (2nd ed.), 377, 378. This is
the passage picked up as the relevant authority by Harrison Moore: The Common-
wealth of Australia (1902), 231 n. 1.
11. Sawer: loc. cit. supra n. 2, cites passages from Quick and Garran, Harrison Moore
(1910) and Inglis Clark. The comments in the text infra apply to all these works,
not least to that of Inglis Clark, a dogmatic exponent of American constitutional
doctrines who was not present at the Conventions after 1891. See Reynolds: "A. I.
Clark's American Sympathies and his influence on Australian Federation" (1958)
32 Australian Law Journal 62.
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authorities' pronouncements. In the last analysis, it is a bootstrap argument.
The modern lawyer looks at the Constitution, and his habits and techniques
of thought persuade him that its form indicates a certain intention; in support
of this inference he cites, not available travaux priparatoires, but the opinions
of early legal commentators. He fails to ask whether these commentaries were
written as histories grounded on their authors' experience as founders, or
whether they merely relied on the very same habits, techniques and systemati-
cally restricted data as grounded his own original inference.
For one thing, it is a little disconcerting to find appeals to the second edition
of Harrison Moore's Commonwealth of Australia (1910). In the first edition
of the work (1902) Harrison Moore gave considerable prominence to Story's
quotation from Sergeant, quoted above 12 . He raised "the question whether any
judicial power may be exercised, except by courts constituted as required by
section 72" 13, and began his answer:
In the United States it is accepted, notwithstanding the general terms
used, that a certain amount of judicial power has been commonly, and
perhaps necessarily, associated with certain offices; and that this power
is exercisable under the United States by the like officers, though they
are not protected under the terms of the Constitution [relating to
judicial tenure] 14
On the question as it related to Australia he made no further general
comments. But in 1910, under the influence of the decision in Huddart Parker
v. Moorehead (1909), he added a whole chapter to emphasise a vigorous, if
nuanced, conception of separation of powers that simply is lacking in the first
edition 15. Is the second edition closer to the intentions of the founders than
the first? If the later is to be admitted as better evidence than the earlier, one
should proceed straight to the memoirs (1958) of Sir Robert Garran, secretary
to the final Drafting Committee (1897-8)! And here it is declared that the
language of forms of "powers" was introduced, in section 71, only "as a drafts-
man's neat arrangement, without any hint of further significance"' 16.
Once again, to consider fairly what the founders might have had in mind
in distinguishing between powers, one is forced to consider further the possible
types of distinction or separation between "powers". It is here that one meets
the ambiguity already mentioned, to which we now turn.
12. Loc. cit. supra n. 10.
13. Harrison Moore: op. cit. supra n. 10, at 280
14. Ibid.
15. Harrison Moore: The Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed., 1910), 303-324.
Huddart Parker v. Moorehead (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330, is cited in the first footnote at
303.
16. Garran: Prosper the Commonwealth (1958), 194. Of course, Garran's evidence is
of no more historical value than that of the writers cited by Sawer. Garran refers
for support to Griffith C.J.'s remarks in Baxter v. Ah Way (1909) 8 C.L.R. 826
Moreover, his opinion as expressed in his memoirs happens to reproduce as history
the legal arguments he had to make as Attorney-General and counsel for the
Commonwealth in Roche v. Kronheimer (1921) 29 C.L.R. 329, at 334-335; cf.
also his submissions in ex parte Walsh and Johnson (1925) 37 C.L.R. 36, at 45.
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A Theoretical Distinction
At a verbal level, this ambiguity springs from the word "power", which may
signify either an institution (cf. "a power in the land") or the powers of that
institution 17. The ambiguity is not peculiar to English; it may be discerned,
for example, in Aristotle'. Historically, the ambiguity has been exacerbated
by the eighteenth century usage of such words as "judiciary" indifferently as
substantives ("the judiciary") or as adjectives ("the judiciary power")1 9.
But the ambiguity goes beyond the verbal level. There are in fact two differ-
ent ways of conceiving and working with any theory or doctrine of separation of
powers. On the one hand, one may postulate a number of government institu-
tions, and require that no person be a member of more than one of these, that
none of these institutions do any of the jobs assigned to the others, and in general
that their organisation, personnel and tasks be kept entirely separate. For
example, one might plan a constitution in which there would be a 'bicameral
Legislature, a -body of officials from which all members of the Legislature were
excluded, and a Supreme Court and a regular 'hierarchy of specified courts in
which membership of the Legislature or employment in any other official
capacity was a disqualification for office. One could delimit more or less
exactly the respective tasks of these three institutions. Then, if one left it at
that, one would be thinking about the separation of these three "powers-in-the-
land" in a way which we shall call Institutional. In particular, one's demand
for separation would extend only to the three institutions, their personnel and
their jobs; it would have no further necessary implications. Thus, if it were
later, or collaterally, decided to establish a new institution to deal with a
special social problem, no implication would necessarily arise concerning the
staffing or work of this body; for the doctrine of separation concerned itself-
one might say, exhausted its concern-with the effective separation from one
another of the three concrete institutions named and defined.
On the other hand, one may postulate a conceptual system of governmental
functions, and require that these functions be exercised so entirely separately that
no institution of government should exercise more than one of them. For ex-
ample, one might conceive a constitution in which there would be three func-
tions or powers of government: legislative, executive and judicial. Then there
might be any number of institutions set up to exercise these powers, or func-
tions, 'but all of them subject to the overriding requirement that no person or
body should exercise more than one such function. Then one would 'be thinking
about the separation of these three powers of government in a way which we
shall call Abstract. Here the doctrine of separation is logically prior to every
particular institution, whereas in the Institutional way of thinking the
17. Vile: Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) at p. 12, discusses
further ambiguities not relevant here.
18. See the use of the term morion throughout the Politics.
19. See for example Blackstone: Commentaries, Intro. s.2; also 1, 2, ii; I, 3; Montes-
quieu: The Spirit of the Laws (trans. Nugent 1750), xi, 6 (and the original
French likewise); Locke: Of Civil Government, xii, 143, 148.
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"doctrine" of separation can really be spoken of only as a sort of shorthand,
very circumscribed in reference, derived from the planned separation of certain
particular institutions. Hence, according to the Abstract doctrine, all proposed
institutions would be required, like all existing ones, to conform to the require-
ment that only one of the (say, three) postulated types of work be done by any
one person or body.
There will 'be special legal problems for any constitution embodying either
form of the doctrine. There will always, for example, -have ito be some effective
principle of ultra vires to restrain one institution from -trespassing on the ground
of another. Where -the Institutional doctrine is ruling, the problem of ultra
vires arises only in connection with the particular institutions required to be
kept separate, and is soluble by reference to the respective definitions of the
powers of these institutions. Of course, these definitions may be more or less
general, and at the extreme of generality may do no more than invoke such a
schema of functions as in any case grounds the Abstract doctrine. But in the
Institutional scheme, even in this extreme case, the need for an explication of
these functions arises only in connection with certain nominated institutions,
and the demand for separation of functions will tend to be subordinate to any
other 'purposes or principles discernibly inherent in those institutions and in the
constitution as a whole. In the Abstract scheme, by contrast, the functions of
the institutions will be understood very generally; for it is the functions (.in
their exercise, of course, by persons or institutions) -that are to 'be kept separate.
Moreover, all persons and institutions (unless specifically exempted) have to
conform to a requirement which overrides any particular purposes or principles
that, as embodied in offices or institutions, might conflict with its quite general
application. So the problem of explicating general terms, which may arise in a
more or less subordinate way in the context of an Institutional doctrine, will
certainly be paramount in the context of any Abstract doctrine of separation
of powers.
The Distinction Applied
The question whether the Constitution embodies an Abstract doctrine of
separation of powers is the question underlying the Wheat Case (1915)20.
For in this case, the question arose whether an institution provided for in the
Constitution, but falling outside the explicit provisions of Chapters I, II and III
for the Parliament (or legislative power), Executive (or executive 'power) and
Judiciary (or judicial power), must conform to a doctrine of separation of
powers conceived precisely in the Abstract fashion. Not all the judges faced
this issue 21 ; but most did, and the clash between Institutional and Abstract
doctrines was in fact direct. That this was the real problem in the Wheat
Case has not -been noticed, partly because the language of all the judgments of
the High Court appears at first glance to reflect only the Abstract doctrine
that has prevailed unchallenged since 1915. But first impressions are mislead-
ing; as we have 'pointed out, it is possible in the extreme case, (as here), for
20. N.S.W. v. Commonwealth (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54.
21. Griffith C.J. and Powers J. can be said to have avoided it.
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the definition of -the nominated institutions in an Institutional scheme to invoke
the same schema of powers and functions as in any case grounds the Abstract
doctrine. What is in question is not the language employed to define the
powers of institutions, 'but whether a schema of powers is invoked as basic,
prior .to all institutions, and hence as both exhaustive and controlling.
There can be little doubt that in the Wheat Case it was the opinion of
Isaacs J. that was decisive; the judgments of Griffith C.J., and Powers and
Rich JJ. have a perfunctoriness that would, in so important a case, be remark-
able (especially for Griffith C.J.), were it not that the majority view was so
exhaustively argued by Isaacs J. The judgment of Isaacs J., in fact, is seminal
in the history of the Australian Constitution; it provides the major premise for
almost every significant development in the law of separation of powers, and
its implications are not yet exhausted.
For Isaacs J. the primary consideration was "the general frame of the
Constitution"' 22. The fundamental principle was the "separation of powers",
the "dominant principle of demarcation":
we find delimited with scrupulous care, the great branches of Govern-
ment. To use the words of Marshall C.J. in Wayman v. Southard: "the
difference between the departments undoubtedly is that the legislature
makes, the executive executes and the judiciary construes the law." That
describes the primary function of each department, though there may
'be incidents to each power which resemble the other main powers, but
are incidents only23 .
It would require "very explicit and unmistakable words to undo the effect of
the dominant principle of demarcation" 24. Thus the linchpin of his argument
was precisely that there could be no "fourth branch' 25 of the Constitution;
that every institution must conform itself to one or other of the three exhaus-
tive categories of power, but never to more than one; that the federal courts
referred to in Chapter III were the sole repositories of every judicial power
that was not merely quasi-judicial and subordinate.
Historically speaking, to show that the Constitution was intended to embody
a three-way "dominant principle of demarcation", one would have first to
consider whether section 101, as intended, was not inconsistent with the pos-
tulation of such a principle 26 . In the Wheat Case, Isaacs J. sought to demon-
strate the true intention of section 101 by postulating as primary and self-
evident the very principle whose validity (as a matter of real intention) is in
part dependent on a prior judgment as to the intended meaning of section 101.
By adhering to this reasoning of Isaacs J. ever since, the High Court has
absolved itself from further inquiry into actual intentions. The legal principle
22. (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54, at 90.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Isaacs at Fed. Cony. Deb. (Melb.) 1898, 2279; quoted in text infra at n. 68.
26. Const. s.101. "There shall be an Inter-State Commission, with such powers of
adjudication and administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execu-
tion and maintenance, within the Commonwealth, of the p~ovisions of this Con-
stitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder."
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of demarcation in the Australian Constitution prescinds from, and is superior
to, both provisions as to particular institutions and establishments, and
questions of what historically was intended by the arrangements of the Con-
stitution. To put the matter very shortly: since the Wheat Case it has been
possible for the High Court to hold that any institution established or authorised
to be established by the Constitution must conform to the triadic demarcation
of powers, regardless of whether the founders intended it to be conformed or
not2 7 .
By contrast, there are Barton and Gavan Duffy JJ. in dissent in the Wheat
Case. Their views, though in all respects in conformity with the historically
discoverable intention of section 10128, have 'been rejected beyond call. In their
view the word "adjudication" in section 101 embraced both administrative and
judicial functions29, and there were no grounds for saying that the judicial
must be subordinate to the administrative30 . It was for Parliament to grant
such powers as it considered necessary:
The Parliament, in giving the Commission the status and some of the
powers of a Court, has acted in exercise of a discretion expressly com-
mitted to it, an exercise which this Court cannot dispute or frustrate
except in obedience to some controlling context. The opposite conten-
tion amounts to this, that Parliament was bound to withold any status
or power of a Court from a body which was to perform the extremely
important functions which the framers of the Constitution declared that
this Commission was to exercise, the nature of those functions being such
that many of them could only be exercised inter partes.
31
Thus the reasoning of the dissenting Justices was founded on an Institutional
approach to the interpretation of the whole Constitution. They would not
admit that a "controlling context" could be deduced from ,the arrangement of
the first three chapters of the Constitution, nor from the apparent exhaus-
tiveness of section 71 read apart, or in abstraction, from Chapter IV 3 2 . They
insisted that Chapter III was concerned only with the "general Judicature"
of the Commonwealth 33 ; it did not prevent the establishment of other institu-
tions:
Under this Chapter the general judiciary system of the Commonwealth
is provided for, and it has no relation to tribunals instituted or appoin-
ted for special purposes and confined in their jurisdiction to the
27. This is not to deny that the High Court has not sometimes admitted exceptions to
the principle, such as powers conferred under s.122 of the Constitution with
respect to Commonwealth territories, the judicial powers of Parliament under ss.47
and 49 of the Constitution, and the powers of courts-martial under s.51 (vi).
28. See text infra s.IV, (v).
29. (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54, at 101-102 (Gavan Duffy J.).
30. Id. at 70 (Barton J.); 102 (Gavan Duffy J.).
31. Id. at 71 (Barton J.) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 103.
33. Id. at 72-73, 103. Compare O'Connor ("your ordinary courts") in Deb. Fed.
(Cony. (Melb.) 1898, 2284; Higgins J. ("general jurisdiction") in Alexander's Case
(1918) 25 C.L.R. 434, at 476.
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enforcement and upholding of any special and limited class of laws34 .
Thus there was no Abstract principle of demarcation which was to be
assumed to be superior and prior to such special purposes and institutions as
might be found otherwise unambiguously in, for example, -the last five Chapters
of the Constitution"5 . It might well be that the words "execution and main-
tenance", as used in both section 101 and section 61, connoted "executive"
rather than "judicial". But the powers conferred by sections 101 and 61 were:
not directed to perform the same functions but to attain the same end.
Powers entirely different in their nature may be exercised for the pur-
pose of bringing about the same result, and the exercise of judicial
functions may appear to Parliament to be as necessary for the pre-
scribed purposes as the exercise of adminstrative functions36 .
There was thus no rule that every institution established under the Constitu-
tion must always and necessarily be confined to the performance of one type of
function to which other functions could only be ancillary; particular intentions
and purposes were prior and superior to questions of types of powers or
function:
It is true that a Court usually confines itself to the performance of
strictly judicial duties and that many of the duties of the Commission
must be purely executive, and it is equally true that a "corporation"
(section 4) discharging judicial duties as a Court and executive duties
which require none of the special powers of a Court, must look ugly
and anomalous in the eyes of a lawyer, but that does not determine the
question at issue. It may well be that those who framed the Constitution
were impressed with the necessity of giving to the Inter-State Commis-
sion in Australia such an anomalous character because they recognised
that in the United States the Inter-State Commission was enfeebled and
impeded in the performance of its duties by its want of judicial power
and by the inability of Congress to give it such power. 37 .
In brief, the Constitution was to be regarded as primarily a disposition of
institutions established for their own particular ends, and only secondarily and
subordinately as a demarcation of functions; it was not to be interpreted simply
by reference to a principle, by prescinding from the possibility of anomalous or
special institutions; it was not to be interpreted by prescinding from the his-
torically determinable intentions of the founders38 .
If a further illustration of the distinction between Abstract and Institutional
34. Id. at 73.
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id. at 102.
37. Ibid.
38. Rich J.'s judgment closely followed the theories and conceptual structure of
Isaacs J's. Griffiths C.J.'s judgment, strictly construed, involved no large principles
of constitutional interpretation; it turned on a construction of s.72 and of the
emphasis of s.101. It is, of course, possible to speculate whether so odd and
limiting a construction of s.101 must not have had some more abstract premise,
such as Isaacs J. articulated. Powers J. agreed, he said, with the reasoning of
both Griffith C.J. and Isaacs J., and added nothing to their analyses.
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doctrines and strategies is required, it may be useful to look at the Boiler-
maker's Case3. The basic premise of the High Court's judgment is that essen-
tially non-judicial functions may not be vested in essentially judicial institu-
tions39 . To support this premise, explicit and repeated appeal is made, as
well as to -the arguments already noted in section I above40 , to a fundamental
principle of federalism:
The position and constitution of the judicature could not be considered
accidental to the institution of federalism: for upon the judicature
rested the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance and enforcement
of the boundaries within which governmental power might be exercised
and upon that the whole system was constructed .... 41
But this argument really supports only the Institutional conclusion that the
High Court (or at most, the general federal judicature) must be kept free for
purely judicial activities42. For section 75 (v) ensures, even if section 73 (ii)
gives only a partial guarantee, that the High Court retains an overall judicial
control of the Constitution 43. No other tribunal could supplant its "ultimate
39. This is the "basal reason" offered to justify, a fortiori, the major premise immed-
iately relevant to the case: that judicial powers may not be attached to a body
whose essence is non-judicial. (1955-56) 94 C.L.R. 254, 289, 267, 271, 296.
40. Summarily stated at (1955-56) 94 C.L.R. 254, 275.
41. Id. at 276; also 267-268. See also the remarks of Dixon C.J., Williams, Webb and
Fullagar, JJ. on the special nature and problems of federalism in O'Sullivan v.
Noarlunga Meat Ltd. [No. 2] (1955-56) 94 C.L.R. 367 at 375.
42. That is, if it supports any relevant conclusion at all-for it might be thought that
the demands of s.72 for life tenure of all persons exercising federal judicial power
already provided a sufficient guarantee of the independence of the judiciary. And
after all, nothing in the Constitution can prevent the Executive packing even the
High Court with its creatures. Oversight of this fact vitiates, too, the arguments
of Isaacs J. in the Wheat Case (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54, at 94, to the effect that the
Inter-State Commission could not be allowed to exercise judicial powers because its
members might be non-lawyers. For where is the provision that Justices of the
High Court shall be lawyers? Not in the Constitution. Notice that the objection
raised in the text supra was put to Owen Dixon in cross-examination on his
evidence before the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1927 (Minutes of
Evidence, 729):
Dixon: I am very much in favour of hedging the judiciary with the greatest
possible safeguards. They have an extremely difficult function to perform.
The independence of the judiciary is worth a great deal more than,
perhaps, people fully realise, and the tendency to interfere with the
judiciary is necessarily great, because everyone who has power of his own
naturally resents being overruled by the judiciary. It is the judiciary's
function to overrule those who have the power, and, I think the less it
is possible for the judiciary to be interfered with, the better. That is
what independence is given to them for.
Counsel: That is in regard to the High Court and a major Court?
Dixon: I think it is true of all courts. It crops up in the most unexpected ways
and in the most inferior tribunals.
43. Const. s.75 "In all matters- . . . (v) In which a writ of Mandamus or prohibition
or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: the High
Court shall have original jurisdiction". See Wynes: Legislative, Executive and
judicial Powers in Australia, (3rd ed. 1962), at 604-607. Const. s.73 "The High
Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions and subject to such regulations
as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments,
decrees, orders and sentences . . . (ii) Of any other federal court, or court exercis-
ing federal jurisdiction . . ." See Wynes: op. cit., at 648-653. Compare Dixon's
remark in 1927 (Minutes of Evidence, 782): "It is competent to Parliament (by
a combined exercise of the power to create new courts and the power given under
the words "with such exceptions"), to create a new tribunal without appeal to
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responsibility for the maintenance and enforcement of the boundaries within
which governmental power [may] be exercised". The Abstract conclusion that
no tribunal exercising any federal judicial power may exercise any other power
is attained by a slide from the Institutional "judicature" to the Abstract
"judicial power".
III
Another Theoretical Distinction
The Wheat Caise, the Boilermakers' Case and not a few other cases may
prompt the reflection that the requirement of an Abstract separation of powers
has been insisted upon by the judiciary against the legislature and the execu-
tive. This record of struggle between politico-legislative projects and legal-
judicial canons of interpretation may suggest caution in accepting the view
that a separation of powers, in the legally established sense, was intended by
the founders of the Constitution. It suggests that, quite apart from the gener-
alities of "realist" iconoclasm, one's initial hypothesis ought to be: that the
relation between judicial interpretation and the politico-legislative intentions
of the founders is similar to the relation between judicial interpretation and the
politico-legislative projects declared unconstitutional -in the light of that inter-
pretation. And the latter relation can be described as the product of a method
of abstraction.
What does abstraction mean in this context44 ? It means a presupposition
of the systematic nature of the relevant data. It means a prescinding from, or
elimination of, further questions (as to history, intention, practicality, etc.)
that would tend to undermine the foregoing presupposition. It means system-
atising the data by reference to principles of the greatest possible generality and
scope of application (to which, if need -be, exceptions can be admitted) in
preference to the enunciation of a greater number of less general principles
that might require fewer unexplained exceptions but that would fail to present
a comparable appearance of symmetry and "principle." It means preferring
distinctions between apparently sharply defined "concepts" to distinctions
between "greater and lesser", "partly and partly", "more and less", "in one
sense and in another sense", etc., within the same concept. It means using the
notion of "the criterion" ("the test") with an apparent unselfconsciousness
hardly consistent with firm recognition of the analogical character of most of
the concepts in a legal system 45. It means (though the connection is not
the High Court, and to confide to a single person the decision of any question,
however momentous". Unless s.75(v) is borne in mind, Dixon's remark can
involve a suggestio falsi.
44. Compare the following account with Dixon's remarks about generalization and
analysis, op. cit. supra n. 5, at 590.
45. A term is analogical when its meaning shifts systematically as one moves from one
area of usage to another. A term like "judicial power" is analogical because it
embraces a set of features and values, of which all may be present in one case ofjudicial power (which may be called the central analogate), but of which only
some may be present in other cases that still can be usefully called cases of
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analytic, and the phenomenon is partly explicable by other causes) never or
rarely acknowledging in judgments the difficulties of decision, of reconciling
precedents, of defining principles and of selecting definitions, but always or
normally presenting the conclusion as an apodeictic consequence of principles
and definitions whose scope and place in the system is undoubted. In our
present case, it means in particular, the radical tendency to prefer the Abstract
to the Institutional interpretation of the separation of powers in the Australian
Constitution, and to employ the essentialist method of once-for-all character-
isation in the application of the Abstract doctrine46 .
If P. H. Lane's analysis4 7 were to be adopted, the foregoing method or
tendency would have to be described, perhaps, as a "metafactor". Nonetheless,
it is a reality that students of Australian constitutional law will be able to
readily verify and amply illustrate. So to forestall misunderstanding it will be
as well to point out that the tendency in question is nothing but a particular
modality of a quite general phenomenon-legal discourse and lawyer-like habits
of mind. Without exploring the phenomenon in detail, it is possible to indicate
why legal thought and system are characterised almost inescapably by abstrac-
tion. For they are grounded in desire for system in affairs and in the need to
opt definitely as 'between parties to disputes. The first can be attained only by,
and the second demands, the definition of terms, restriction on further ques-
judicial power. This set of features and values constitutes a system because of
the more or less definite place of the central analogate or model, and because a
link between this central case and the other (that is, analogous) cases is provided
by the values that are more or less common to all cases of "judicial power" and
that should have, therefore, a certain priority in-the characterisation of that power.
46. Thus the fundamental minor premise of the majority judgment in the Boilermakers'
Case: "One thing that Alexander's Case did decide once and for all is that the
function of an industrial arbitrator is completely outside the realm of judicial
power and is of a different order": (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, at 281. This
should be read along with the claim made by Isaacs and Rich JJ., in W.W.F. v.
Gilchrist, Watt and Sanderson (1924) 34 C.L.R. 482, at 50"7, that Alexander's
Case had "definitely ascertained" the "nature" of arbitral functions. This claim
was rejected by the majority in W.W.F. v. Gilchrist, Watt and Sanderson, and
the distinction has been maintained ever since, between "judicial" in the sense of
s.71 and "judicial" in the sense relevant to the issue of prohibition. And it is not
true that Alexander's Case settled the question whether arbitral powers are irre-
deemably non-judicial, whatever the character of the institution on which they are
conferred. For the "essence" of the Arbitration Court was not, in the relevant
sense, in question in that case; all that was necessary for Isaacs and Rich, JJ. was
to determine whether the arbitral powers were severable from the improperly con-
ferred judicial powers of the Court. True, they said at one point that the Court
was not constituted "in reliance on" Chapter III (25 C.L.R. 434, at 467; but
contrast 469, quoted infra note 78) ; but it is equally true that in the various recon-
stitutions of the Court after Alexander's Case (notably that of 1926) the
Parliament did act "in reliance on" Chapter III. True, the majority in the
Boilermakers' Case made their own examination of the historical essence of the
Arbitration Court, concluding that its judicial powers were no more than "con-
sequential, accessory or incidental authorities annexed to the powers and functions
in the performance of which the Arbitration Court finds the real or dominant
purpose of its being." (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254, at 288-289. But this examina-
tion was prefaced by the fallacious interpretation of Alexander's Case, and con-
sequently never alluded to the possibility that the institution might have a double
"essence". If Parliament determines that annexation of judicial powers to the
Court is a sine qua non for the settlement by arbitration of industrial disputes, on
what grounds does the High Court declare that these judicial powers are not
"essential"? (On the misinterpretation of Alexander's Case in the Boilermakers'
Case see further n. 78 infra).
47. Lane: Some Principles and Sources of Australian Constitutional Law (1964).
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tions and reliance on authority and precedent. Obviously, "once-for-all charac-
terisation" is just the reverse of this coin.
Still, the mind has habits and acquired dispositions as well as needs and
capacities, and some of the Australian cases suggest that the legal mind has
a habit of carrying the desire for determinacy and the presumption of simple
and workable systems of terms and relations to a point that can only be
described as optional and habitual rather than necessary or always and every-
where desirable.
IV
Some Further Applications
A full survey of the relevant evidence will require a monograph. But when
that is written, I think it will be found to support the following propositions.
(i) The records (admittedly fragmentary) of the American Federal Con-
vention of 1787 reveal general concern only for an Institutional separa-
tion of President (Executive), Congress and Supreme Court. Despite
the existence of Abstract formulations in many existing State constitu-
tions (especially the then more recent ones)48, Abstract language rarely
appears in the debates until after the report of the drafting committee
(Committee of Detail) 49. The official resolutions committed by the Con-
vention to its drafting committee were Institutional in form50 ; the
committee's draft produced the present Abstract formulae from which
so much has been deemed to follow 51. Lawyer-like concerns for
symmetry at a high level of abstraction manifest themselves in the
drafting as well as the construction of documents.
48. See constitutions of South Carolina (1776), Maryland (Declaration of Rights,
1776), Pennsylvania (1776), North Carolina (Declaration of Rights, 1776), New
York (1777), Massachusetts (Declaration of Rights, 1779), New Hampshire (Bill
of Rights, 1784).
49. The language of the Pinckney Plan, as reconstructed at the beginning of this
century by Jameson, McLaughlin and Farrand, can be interpreted as Abstract, but
should probably be regarded as Institutional in intent, like the language of the
Constitution of Virginia when read with s.5 of the Virginian Bill of Rights. The
Virginian language was taken over by Pinckney. For his plan, which was not that
debated or adopted by the Convention, see Farrand: Records of the Federal Con-
vention (1937), III, 595; I, 23.
50. These were the Randolph resolutions: Farrand, Records, I, 21-22, 28, 33; II,
131-133.
51. In the drafting, the Committee of Detail appears to have been strongly influenced
by the lawyer-like language of Hamilton's plan of 18th June, even though the
substance of Hamilton's ideas met with no general approval. Compare ss. 1, 2 and
3 of Hamilton's plan (Records, I, 291) with ss. 2, 12 and 14 of the first surviving
full draft prepared by the Committee (Records, II, 163, 171, 172. See also the
incompletely preserved draft prepared for the Committee by Wilson (Records, II,
152) especially ss. 2 and 3, and compare these sections with the Institutional
formula of the resolution committed to the Committee (Records, II, 129): "the
Government of the United States ought to consist of a Supreme Legislative,
Judiciary and Executive." The likelihood that Hamilton's plan was before the
Committee of Detail when the crucial steps were made is increased by the evidence
of the alternative draft of Hamilton's plan in Records, III, 619.
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(ii) There is nothing in the debates in the Australian Federal Conventions
that must be taken to be a discussion, still less a commendation, of the
Abstract doctrine of separation of powers.
(iii) The draft that emerged from the Convention of 1891 contained no
equivalent of the present section 71 of the Constitution. The first three
Chapters of the Draft Bill were entitled "The Parliament", "The Execu-
tive Government", and "The Judicature". Section 1 of Chapter I
began: "The legislative powers of the Commonwealth shall be vested
in a Federal Parliament". Section 1 of Chapter II -began: "The Execu-
tive power and authority of the Commonwealth shall be vested in the
Queen . . . ." But Chapter III began:
1. The Parliament of the Commonwealth shall have -power to establish
a Court, which shall be called the Supreme Court of Australia, and
shall consist of a Chief Justice and so many other Justices, not less
than four, as 'the Parliament from time to time prescribes. The
Parliament may also from time to time, subject to the provisions of
this Constitution, establish other Courts.
7. The Parliament of the Commonwealth may from time to time
define the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Commonwealth, other
than the Supreme Court of Australia . . .But jurisdiction shall not
be conferred on a Court except in respect of the following
matters ....
There followed a list of those heads of jurisdiction which are now
embodied in sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution. The reason for this
set of formulations was, doubtless, to avoid embedding the High Court
in the Constitution, and to leave its creation to the option of the Federal
Parliament. However that may be, no Abstract doctrine of separation
of powers could have been deduced from a Constitution in this form.
The change to the existing formulation was made, not to bring
Australia into line with the United States, nor to secure an Abstract
separation of powers, but simply as a convenient way of "writing the
High Court into the bedrock of the Constitution"52.
Yet this change, alone, happened to provide the basis for the modem
doctrine of separation. This consequence seems accidental and unfore-
seen.
(iv) The only debate explicitly concerned with an issue of separation of
powers was conducted on the Institutional level, without appeals to the
Abstract doctrine, and in any event resulted in a rejection of separation.
Following a debate on 14th April 1897, Josiah Symon moved that "no
person holding any judicial office shall be appointed to or hold the office
52. This was a slogan of the Convention: see Deb. Fed. Cony. (Adel.) 1897, 272
(Reid, Barton and Wise). Evidence for the summary proposition in the text may
be found in Symon's speech, cited supra note 8: the remarks of Wise, a member
of the Judiciary Committee, Deb. Fed. Cony. (Adel.) 1897, 935; reports on the
work of the Committee in Sydney Morning Herald 2 April 1897 p. 5 col. 7 (Wise
may well have been the source of the newspaper's information: see his personal
explanation to the Convention, 5th April 1897, Deb. Fed. Cony. (Adel.) 1897,
404).
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of Governor-General, Lieutenant-Governor, Chief Executive Officer, or
Administrator of the Government, or any other executive office" 53.
Isaac Isaacs said:
We will leave ourselves open to ridicule if we pass the provision.
Symon: My hon. friend does not seem to appreciate the position
of a judge in a Federation. He seems to have forgotten that we
are establishing a Federation.
Isaacs: The word "Federation" is an answer to everything; it is
like the word "Mesopotamia" '54 .
Symon's motion was passed, and became clause 80 of the Draft Bill of
1897. On 1st February, 1898, the clause was confirmed in Committee of
the whole Convention by 25 votes to 20, with Downer, O'Connor,
Symon and Barton ranged in the majority against Isaacs and Higgins5 5.
Thereupon Holder moved an amendment to ensure, further, that no
person holding parliamentary office could be appointed to any of the
executive positions which Symon's clause 80 barred to holders of judicial
office56 .
Isaacs: I think that, accepting the vote which has just been
taken, we ought at least to be consistent.
Symon: The ground on which we have proceeded is a ground
of principle ....
Isaacs: And I want to maintain the principle of separating the
legislative, executive and judicial offices.
Symon: The only reason for our retaining the clause is that we
consider that the Judiciary should be kept absolutely apart from
everything in relation to the Executive . . .57
Holder's amendment was rejected by 20 votes to 17, with Barton
O'Connor and Symon ranged in the majority against Isaacs and
Higgins5". But on 11th March, without debate, clause 80 was deleted
from the Bill by 26 votes to 11 with Isaacs and Higgins in the majority,
and Downer, O'Connor, Symon and Barton in the minority 9 . In 1902
Barton explained that the intention of the Convention in omitting
clause 80 was to leave the matter to the option of the Parliament6".
(v) The Inter-State Commission was undoubtedly intended by the founders
to have, or to be able to 'have, judicial powers of the very sort struck
down in the Wheat Case61 . The unsuccessful campaign against the
53. Deb. Fed. Cony. (Adel.) 1897, 1174.
54. Id. at 1175.
55. Deb. Fed. Cony. (Melb.) 1898, 369.
56. Id. at 370.
57. Id. at 372.
58. Id. at 375.
59. Id. at 2343.
60. 14 Parl. Deb. (Cth.), 1566, confirmed by Higgins at 1567.
61. It would be contrary to our principles to rely on Quick and Garran: Annotated
Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901), at 202: "it was thus con-
templated that the Commission should have judicial functions"; at 900: "The
Commission is intended to be policeman as well as judge."
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whole proposal, waged by Isaacs and Higgins in the Convention, was
predicated not on a principle of separation of powers but on the view
that the supervision of inter-State trade, railways and rivers should be
left to the Federal Parliament 62. No-one in the Conventions pointed to
the powers of the Commission as a violation of, or exception to, any
principle of separation.
This is not the place to summarise the complex debates on the Inter-
State Commission. But the position finally attained may be judged from
the following excerpts from debates at the end of the Melbourne Con-
vention of 1898.
O'Connor: . . . How will this body exercise its powers? It may
exercise them by judicial acts, by decisions in regard to rights,
and a number of other matters. If in those decisions it goes
beyond the limits of the Constitution as assigned to it, surely
there must be power in the High Court to review those
decisions .... 63
Higgins: It is not a court: it is a jury of experts, like our Railway
Commissioners64 .
O'Connor: The honourable member says it is not a court. It may
or may not be a court in the technical sense of the word; but
if it has power to give decisions, surely -that is the first essential
of a court; and if it gives decisions which are not in accordance
with the Constitution there should -be some power of reviewing
them ....
Higgins: Would you allow an appeal from the directors of a
company?
O'Connor: I hope the honourable member will ask something
relevant and analogous65 .
The foregoing interchanges occurred during discussion of clause 74, as
it then was, providing for appeal to the High Court from decisions of
the Inter-State Commission66 . As part of their strategy of opposing
everything to do with the Commission, Turner, Isaacs and Higgins
opposed this portion of clause 74.
Isaacs: . . . I cannot see why you are to put in clause 74 the
Inter-State Commission, when you have given the judicial power
of the Commonwealth [under what was then clause 73]67 exten-
sion to all cases under this Constitution or involving its inter-
pretation... Why will not that include any decision of the Inter-
State Commission which is contrary to this Constitution?
O'Connor: For this reason . . . You have given power to the
62. See for example Isaacs, Deb. Fed. Cony. (Melb.) 1898, 1495, 1525, 2461.
63. Id. at 2277.
64. Id. at 2278; also at 1265, 1268.
65. Id. at 2279.
66. Now Const. s.73.
67. Now Const. s.7 1.
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High Court to entertain appeals from federal courts and courts
invested with federal jurisdiction, and if you want to include the
Inter-State Commission, which is not a federal court, and is not
invested with federal jurisdiction, you must mention it specially.
Isaacs: . . . I want to eliminate the constitutional creation of the
Inter-State Commission. I think it -is a great mistake that we
should erect this body-a fourth branch of the Constitution-
when it ought to be a matter for consideration of the people of
the Commonwealth hereafter, through the Federal Parliament, to
say what they will or will not have.
O'Connor: Surely that was decided in clause 96. The proper
place to reconsider that question is when we come to that
clause6 8.
Glynn, a long-standing opponent of the Inter-State Commission69 ,
pointed out that in America the Inter-State Commission (contrary to
what O'Connor had represented in 1897) was not a judicial body70 .
This, the Chairman said, was irrelevant. But Higgins sought to put
Glynn's point in another way:
Higgins: . . . The Inter-State Commission is not a body that
acts. It is a body that simply decides upon facts-"Is a rate
good?" "Is a charge an infringement of the Constitution?" . . .
That is all the Inter-State Commission has to decide, and I
understood Mr. Symon to say that it is a court, and that there
should be an appeal 71 .
Symon: Oh no. I understood you to say that if the Commission
did not act; and I say that if the Commission has to decide,
there has to 'be an appeal.
Higgins: They have to decide but not as a court.
Reid: The Commission is to be "charged with the execution and
maintenance within the Commonwealth of the provisions of this
Constitution, and of all laws made thereunder relating to trade
and commerce."
Higgins: It is clumsily expressed, but at the same time I should
take that with the other clauses about adjudication, and I should
take the intention to be that they are to see by their decisions
about rates and the rest that the laws are executed; but they will
not execute the laws.
Reid: It is an idle tribunal if it simply meets and expresses an
opinion and cannot enforce its decisions.
Higgins: In America-
Reid: I do not mind that; the American conditions are not
parallel.
Higgins: . . . It is not an executive body in the sense that it has to
do a thing, but it simply has to follow the analogy of the United
68. Deb. Fed. Conv. Melb. 1898, 2279. Clause 96 became Const. s.101.
69. See id. at 1379.
70. Id. at 2280, 2281.
71. Id. at 2282.
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States of America . . . I interjected, and I think relevantly, when
Mr. O'Connor was speaking, that it is not usual to allow an
appeal from directors of a company if they are acting within
the purview of their by-laws . . .
Reid: If your understanding of the Commission is right I quite
see the force of what you say; but we differ as to what the
Commission is to be.
Higgins: . . . I am trusting the Drafting Committee to put this
language right.
Holder: It is right now; it will be wrong if it is altered.
Higgins: I do not think it is the intention of this Committee [of
the whole Convention] to put the Inter-State Commission in
Australia in a different position to what a similar body is in
America.
O'Connor: It has been done already in clause 96 . . . You have
given power to the Parliament to give power to the Inter-State
Commission to adjudicate for the purpose of the maintenance
and execution of the provisions of the Constitution. That enables
the Parliament to constitute the Commission in such a way as to
get rid of the difficulty that has occurred in America; and it may
give power, not only to decide that a rate is illegal, but to enforce
that decision, and also to award damages or compensation to
persons who have 'been injured by the rate . . . If powers of
adjudication of that kind are given, surely you will have a court
with a power of adjudication which will deal with matters of
infinitely larger concern than your ordinary courts will have to
deal with. If you constitute a body of this kind, surely you are
not going to put such a body in an absolutely irresponsible
position 72.
Two minutes later Turner's amendment to delete reference to Inter-
State Commission from clause 74 was negatived without division 73, and
within a further two or three minutes the clause was amended by adding
the words "on questions of law only" (its present form) 74 . It cannot
be doubted that O'Connor and Reid 'had been speaking for the effective
consensus.
Later in the morning of the same day, the final reconsideration of the
Inter-State Commission's powers took place.
Isaacs: There are little over a dozen members present to decide
a matter of utmost importance-the creation of a fourth organ-
in this Constitution.
O'Connor: The question has been pretty well thrashed out
already.
Isaacs: We have the Parliament, the Executive, and the High
Court, and now a fourth branch is created independent of all
the rest-the Inter-State Commission.
72. Id. at 2284.
73. Id. at 2285.
74. Id. at 2286.
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Reid: One you cannot get at-one that is thoroughly indepen-
dent 7 5 .
A few minutes later, Turner's wrecking amendments, supported of
course by Isaacs and Higgins, were rejected by votes of 22 to 15, and
23 to 13. It remained only for the Drafting Committee to polish the
scheme into the present form: sections 101, 102, 103 and 104.
In the light of all that had happened, here only lightly indicated, no-one
could have disputed Deakin's remark in his closing speech to the Con-
vention, a week later: the Inter-State Commission, he said, "will feel
that they are, by appointment and function, a truly federal court. ..,77
(vi) The power of conciliation and arbitration, now referred to in section 51
(xxxv), was always conceived as a mixed power including judicial and
enforcement functions with non-judicial7 . No attempt was made to
justify such a mixture, since no-one at all, however much opposed to it
as a solution to industrial disputes, saw anything constitutionally
anomalous to it.
V
It is possible to exaggerate the significance of the High Court's refusal, ever
since its foundation in 1904, to refer to the vast bulk of the Constitution's
travaux priparatoires. The American experience does not suggest that either
judicial unanimity or historical accuracy is a necessary consequence of allowing
such references. Still, the consequences of the radical limitation on further
questions involved in the Australian refusal are not to be overlooked. The
judges of the High Court are thrown back upon two acknowledged sources for
decision: authority and precedent, and language and linguistic ("formal")
arrangement. In the Wheat Case, the central passage of Isaacs J.'s judgment
reflects both these sources equally:
75. Id. at 2391.
76. Id. at 2393-2395.
77. Id. at 2503. See also Kingston and Barton, id. at 2458
78. Consult Deb. Fed. Cony. 1891, 164, 688 (Kingston), 688-689 (Griffith and
Kingston), 780 (Kingston); Deb. Fed Cony. (Adel.) 1897, 782 (Higgins); Deb.
Fed. Conv. (Melb.) 1898, 182 (Quick), 185 (Kingston). Notice that the majority
judgment in the Boilermakers' Cise asserts that in Alexander's Case, Isaacs, Rich,
Powers and Barton JJ. all "regarded the Arbitration Court as a body whose
creation, form, constitution and status were referable to s.51 (xxxv). They did
not ascribe to the legislature any purpose of exercising the legislative power
contained in s.7 1. The failure of the provisions for the president's tenure to
comply with s. 7 2 . . . was used by their Honours as a ground for supposing that
no intention to rely on s.71 existed". (1955-1956) 94 C.L.R. 254 at 284. But the
conclusion of the relevant argument of Isaacs and Rich, JJ. is: "it follows that any
law passed under s.71 which says that a Justice so appointed shall be displaced or
removed from his office in seven years-which is what s.12 of the Arbitration Act
says-is contrary to the Constitution ..." (1918) 25 C.L.R. 434, at 469 (emphasis
added). (This seems, however, to contradict a passage at 467.) Similarly, Barton
J. concluded: "I am thus of the opinion that the tribunal erected by the Act is a
court in the strict sense, that part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth is
reposed in it, and that thi;s Act creating it must be held to be referable to, and
must be interpreted in the light of, Chapter III of the Constitution": at 457
(emphasis added).
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we find delimited with scrupulous care, the three great branches of
Government. To use the words of Marshall C.J. in Wayman v.
Southard . . .
Our brief study may suggest that the scrupulous care to delimit the three
branches of government must be ascribed to Isaacs J., rather than to the con-
sensus of the founders. What it should not perhaps be taken to suggest, in
itself, is that the judicial construction of the Constitution, as consummated in
the Boilermakers' Case, is to be regarded as unscrupulous or careless. The
lawyer-like habit of mind that facilitates that construction 'has its role-a role
that is defended by the architects of the doctrine of separation so constructed:
It may -be that the court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I should
be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other safe guide
to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and complete legal-
ism . . . Lawyers are often criticised because their work is not construc-
tive. It is not their business to contribute to the constructive activities
of the community, but to keep the foundations and framework steady8s
But just as the work of lawyers should not be confused with the work of
legislators, so it should not be confused with the work of historians or social
philosophers. Whatever may be said of the separation of powers, a distinction
of competences is not in doubt.
79, (1915) 20 C.L.R. 54 at 90.
80. Sir Owen Dixon, Swearing-in as Chief Justice of the High Court, (1952) 85
C.L.R. xi.
